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MOORE v. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND:
PRESERVING ENDANGERED FAMILIES
For more than half a century the Supreme Court has wrestled with
the problem of appropriate guidelines for applying substantive due
process. In recent years, the Court has increasingly relied on history
and tradition for guidance, rather than explicit constitutional direc-
tives. Moore v. City of East Cleveland' is the Court's latest attempt
to reach a solution to this problem. Moore involved a grandmother
who was the head of a household that included her son and two
grandsons, who were first cousins.2 The city's housing ordinance3
limited Moore's dwelling to single-family occupancy,4 and defined
"family" so as to exclude Moore's extended family.5 The city in-
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. Id at 496-97, 497 n.4. Inez Moore lived with her son, Dale Moore, Sr., and
her grandsons, Dale Moore, Jr. and John Moore, Jr. There is some dispute as to
whether John, Jr.'s father was a member of the household. The Court felt that, had
John Moore, Sr. been present, his presence would have constituted an additional vio-
lation. Since the violation listed only John, Jr., the Court commented on only that
particular living arrangement.
3. While Moore v. City of East Cleveland involved a municipal housing ordi-
nance, other attempts to define the family in relation to land management have in-
volved zoning laws. For purposes relevant to the issues in Moore, this difference is
unimportant. Three years prior to Moore, the Court faced similar problems in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), which involved a municipal zoning ordi-
nance. Justice Powell, the author of the plurality opinion in Moore, placed both
cases in a general "land-use" category and distinguished them on the grounds that the
Belle Terre ordinance governed unrelated individuals, while the East Cleveland ordi-
nance interfered with the traditional family.
4. EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO, HOUSING CODE § 1351.02 (1966).
5. The East Cleveland ordinance provides:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the
household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a
single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of spouse of
the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmar-
ried children have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse
of the nominal head of the household.
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formed Moore that one grandson was an illegal occupant and would
have to be removed. Her failure to comply with these demands re-
sulted in a criminal prosecution for violation of the ordinance.6
Moore, appealing the conviction, claimed that the ordinance repre-
sented an unconstitutional violation of her freedom of association
and right of privacy,7 but the decision was upheld by both the Court
of Appeals' and the Ohio Supreme Court.' The United States
Supreme Court overturned the conviction on the grounds that prior
decisions by the Court recognized that the family institution deserved
strong constitutional protection.'0 Justice Powell, writing for a plural-
ity of the Court," concluded that when a law infringes on the family
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may
include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the
nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of
the household and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent
child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who
has more than fifty per cent of his total support furnished for him by the
nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the
household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO, HousiNG CODE § 1341.08 (1966).
6. The ordinance provided for imprisonment of up to six months and a fine of up
to $1,000 for violation of any provisions of the housing code. Each daily violation of
the ordinance could be considered a separate offense. EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO,
HOUSING CODE § 1345.99 (1966).
7. Brief for Appellant at 21, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
8. Ohio's Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the East Cleveland or-
dinance was not in violation of the equal protection clause, ignoring Moore's substan-
tive due process argument. The lone dissent from the three member panel found an
equal protection violation, believing the ordinance to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 33888 (Ct. App. Ohio, July 18, 1975).
9. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision by the Court of Appeals on the
grounds that no substantial constitutional question existed. The court did not elabo-
rate on its holding. Brief for Appellant at Appendix A, p. la, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
10. Justice Powell cited past decisions that recognized the protection of rights sur-
rounding childbearing, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); parental
custody and companionship, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); and child raising,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Justice Powell concluded that "un-
less we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the fam-
ily have been accorded shelter under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,
we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the family
choice involved in this case." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01
(1977).
11. Aoore evoked six different opinions from the nine voting Justices. Justice
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decisionmaking process by regulating permissible living arrange-
ments, the Court will no longer defer to legislative decisions.'
2
The Supreme Court views freedom of choice in the area of family
interests as a liberty protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' 3  This principle originated in Meyer v.
Nebraska,4 where the Court acknowledged that liberty is more than
just "freedom from bodily restraint," 5 and includes many other as-
pects of life such as the right "to marry [and to] establish a home."' 6
Since Meyer, the Court explicitly stated that there is a "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter"' 7 and, through substan-
tive due process, protected many rights surrounding the family rela-
tionship.' 8 The Court's renewed use of substantive due process in
Powell's plurality opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
Concurring opinions were written by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Justices
Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist and White dissented in separate opinions. For the pur-
poses of this Comment, only the opinions of Justices Powell, Stewart and White will
be discussed in any detail.
Justice Brennan's opinion focused on socioeconomic factors surrounding the ex-
tended family. 431 U.S. at 506-13. Justice Stevens approached the issue from the
basis of property rights, concluding that the right of an owner to determine who may
reside on his property is a fundamental right of property ownership. Id at 513-21.
Chief Justice Burger refused to reach the constitutional issue, stating that Moore lack-
ed standing since all administrative variance procedures had not been exhausted. Id
at 521-31.
12. Id at 499.
13. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). See notes 17-
18 infra.
14. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15. Id at 399.
16. Id In Meyer, a state law prohibited any teacher from teaching a modem
language other than English. The Court held that the law invaded a liberty guaran-
teed under the fourteenth amendment. The Court conceded that the state has broad
power to improve its citizens' fives, but ruled that the individual has certain inviolable
fundamental rights. Id at 401.
17. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court in Prince, how-
ever, failed to explicitly delineate the "private realm of family life." Prince involved
an extended family relationship between an aunt and her niece, a living arrangement
that would have been allowed under the East Cleveland ordinance. See note 5 and
accompanying text supra.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of a woman to terminate her preg-
nancy); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of an unwed father to raise his
illegitimate child); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (right of procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(right of parents to control their child's eduction).
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this context, however, continued old debates 9 that many believed
were resolved when the Court stated that it would not sit as a "super
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation. '20 _
Substantive due process blends several constitutional elements to
produce a limitation on governmental authority.21 The main thrust
of the doctrine limits the power of state legislatures to curtail a per-
son's liberty and property rights.22 The Supreme Court, however,
traditionally defers to those legislative actions that represent a valid
application of the state's police power and do not invade any funda-
mental rights.23
19. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text infra. One commentator states that
"this untenable line of decisions came to a precipitant halt during the New Deal
Years. In one field after another-labor law, price control, taxation-the law turned
180 degrees. Substantive due process, which had once threatened vast areas of social
and economic legislation, became a 'last resort of constitutional arguments.'" Vieira,
Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of4bortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
867, 871 (1974) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
20. Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). The Court
reaffirmed this notion when it stated it would not return to a time when the due proc-
ess clause was used "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because.., the challenged statute may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
731-32 (1963). See note 23 infra.
21. Henkin, Privacy and4utonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1411-12 (1974).
Substantive due process may be viewed as a reflection of the philosophies of Locke,
Blackstone, and Rousseau, involving "the original equality and independence of the
individual, the sovereignty of the people .... limited government by consent of the
governed for purposes determined by them, and rights retained under the govern-
ment." Id at 1412. See generally Dixon, New Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic:.4 Prolegomenon, 1976 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 43; Landyn-
ski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty. "4 Screen of Words Expressing
Will in the Service of Desire?' 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1974).
22. Henkin, Privacy and,4utomony, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1412 (1974).
23. One of the first cases noting the existence of fundamental rights was Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), where the Court found a hierarchy
among various rights. In dealing with the topic of privileges and immunities, Justice
Washington in Cogfeld stated:
We [the Court] feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privi-
leges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states. . . . What these fundamental princi-
ples are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to emumerate. They
may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protec-
tion by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty with the right to ac-
quire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may pre-
scribe for the general good of the whole.
Id at 551. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy); Sha-
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Although the Court recognizes that fundamental rights deserve in-
creased protection, it has never explicitly defined what constitutes a
"fundamental right." Instead, it has simply described them as rights
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"24 or as "princi-
ples of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people"25 that they deserve particular protection.
A fundamental right is not entirely immune from legislative in-
fringement. 26  A statute that regulates in a "sensitive area of lib-
erty' '27 is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. It will be upheld if it
fulfills a compelling state interest.28 In determining whether a state
interest is "compelling" the Court demands a valid relationship be-
tween the statutory means and the legislative goal, and makes a sub-
jective determination as to the appropriateness of the enactment.29
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (right of access to the
courts); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The Court stated:
In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal gov-
ernment by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments [e.g., Ist, 6th]
have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the fourteenth amendment, became valid as against the States.
Id at 324-25.
25. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). The most vague, yet per-
haps most accurate, description defines a fundamental right simply as an interest "ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. . . ." San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Seegenerall, Hen-
kin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
26, Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in
Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 628, 639-40 (1973). This concept
is an accepted constitutional doctrine. Justice Goldberg noted that "'[w]here there is
a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.' Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516,524(1966). The law must be shown 'necessary and not merely rationally related
to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964)." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1975) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun reiterated this concept in Roe v. Wade when he stated
"[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'.., and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interest at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
See Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Sub-
stantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 628, 639-40 (1973).
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
29. Part of the subjective determination is an evaluation of the enactment in light
1978]
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The Court's application of substantive due process is often a source
of conflict,3" generally because there are no specific guidelines for de-
termining which rights are fundamental and which interests are com-
pelling. At times the Court looks no further than specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights to determine fundamental rights.31 Various Jus-
tices of the Court, however, embrace the position that the fourteenth
amendment liberty is "more than that which is enumerated in the Bill
of Rights."32 In recent years, the Court applied a more subjective
test, looking to the nation's history and tradition for guidance.33
of the court's notion of morality and decency. See Note, Roe and Doe Does Privacy
Have a Principle? 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
30. Judicial concern for the lack of proper guidance in the application of substan-
tive due process has its source in the decisions following Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). This was a period in which the Court relied on American history and
traditions to provide guidance for their decisions. Although the primary targets of
the Court's substantive due process decisions were business, labor and price regula-
tions, the application of the doctrine was not exclusively limited to those areas, Two
of the most notable exceptions were Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
The decisions of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), triggered a renewal of the debate of what guidelines the
Court should employ. See generally Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Or-
dered Libery" '"4 Screen of Words Expressing Will in the Service of Desire?" 2 HoF-
sTRA L. Rv. 1 (1974); Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State
Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 628 (1973).
31. Proponents of this method of decisionmaking have held that the Bill of Rights
is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and that the Court is
thereby limited to the first eight amendments for sources of fundamental rights. His-
torically, Justice Black is associated with this position, recognizing the existence of
substantive due process in the fourteenth amendment but refusing to extend the doc-
trine beyond the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Kauper, Penumbras, Perph-
eries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64
MICH. L. REv. 235, 247 (1965). Justice Black's opposition to the use of "natural law"
as the basis for decisionmaking reflected his fear that such a method would allow the
Justices to "roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness,
and actually select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the
legislative representatives of the people." Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 601 n.4 (1942) (Black, Douglas and Murphy, J.J., concur-
ring). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973).
33. Justice Harlan is recognized as the major spokesman for this position on the
modem Court. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Harlan
stated that judicial restraint in the area of substantive due process was best "achieved
• ..only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history... ." Id
at 501. Opponents of this natural law concept of due process have feared that the
approach would lead to "unprincipled" judicial decisionmaking. See generally
(Vol. 15:337
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This subjective test allows the Court great discretion in classifying
certain rights as fundamental.
The opinions in Moore illustrate both sides of this conflict. Justice
Powell and a plurality of the Court applied a natural law concept to
the facts, treating the family right as fundamental.34 While the Con-
stitution does not explicitly protect the familial relationship," Justice
Powell noted that decisions beginning with Meyer3 6 continually ex-
tended judicial protection to the family.37
Justices White38 and Stewart,39 in dissent, advocated a traditional
approach, seeking explicit constitutional directives for substantive
due process cases.4 While the two dissents agreed upon the meth-
ods that should be used in the decisionmaking process,41 they differed
in their resolution of whether Moore's specific interest warranted pro-
Vieira, Roe and Doe. Substantive Due Process and the Right fAbortion, 25 HASTINGS
L. 867 (1974); Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty: "4
Screen of Words Expressing Will in the Service ofDesire?" 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. (1974).
See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 601 n.4
(1942).
34. See note 10 supra.
35. See notes 32-33 supra.
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). This interpreta-
tion is not a new judicial concept. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the
Court recognized that parents were superior to all other groups in rearing their chil-
dren. The Court based its decision on the "strong tradition" of these parental rights
in the "history and culture of western civilization." Id at 232. The result of this
judicial recognition of the "family" as a protectible interest is increased judicial scru-
tiny of laws affecting the family. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04
(1965) (White, J., dissentiX3). See also Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The
Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
628, 639-40 (1973).
38. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissent-
ing).
39. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 531 (1977) (Stewart, J., with
Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. Id at 544. Justice White cited past statements of Justice Black regarding due
process adjudication. Justice Black felt that all substantive due process decisions not
based on explicit constitutional provisions were questionable. This includes many
accepted decisions such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Justice White felt that the Court should not
overrule these past decisions, but did feel that substantive due process should not be
used to invalidate any law the Court considered unreasonable. Id at 543-44. See
note 33 supra.
41. Both Justices recognized the existence of a hierarchy of protectible rights.
See note 25 supra. This interest calls for greater protection of some interests over
others,
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tection under the due process clause. Stewart felt that only those
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 42 deserved protec-
tion.43 In Justice Stewart's opinion, the right to share common living
arrangements did not fall within the concept of a fundamental right"
and could not be equated with the right to marry 45 or terminate
pregnancy.46 Justice White, while recognizing a valid liberty interest
in Moore's situation, believed the issue turned on whether this liberty
interest merited increased protection.47 He concluded that Moore's
liberty interest in residing with her extended family did not warrant
strict judicial scrutiny;48 due process is satisfied when a housing ordi-
nance is both legitimately enacted and not arbitrary in purpose.49
42. Id at 531, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
43. Id
44. Id Justice Stewart based his decision on Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974). While Justice Stewart recognized that Belle Terre concerned unrelated
individuals, he concluded that the case turned on a general right to privacy in the
home rather on a specific living arrangement. Id at 536. Although Moore involves
the specific right of a grandmother to live with her grandchildren, Belle Terre's hold-
ing that there is no explicit right to live with whomever one pleases is directly applica-
ble to the facts in Moore. Id at 535. Justice Stewart questioned why consanguinity
should elevate one group above another.
45. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("marriage is one of the basic
civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival," and is protected
under the due process clause).
46. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 536 n.54 & 55.
47. Id at 546-47 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cited Justice Douglas' re-
marks in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), where Justice Douglas stated that "the
trouble with the holding of the old Court was not in its definition of liberty but in its
definitions of the protection guaranteed to that liberty." Id at 517. Justice White
agreed with Justice Powell that Moore showed a liberty interest. Justice White, how-
ever, drew the issue more narrowly than did Justice Powell and was only willing to
examine the liberty interest of a grandmother's right to live with two sets of grandchil-
dren in her home. 431 U.S. 494, 546-47.
48. 431 U.S. at 549. After Justice White established that Moore showed a liberty
interest, he considered the degree of protection required to protect that interest, con-
cluding that the liberty interest deserved only the most basic due process protections.
Thus, the Court should not apply the more stringent strict scrutiny examination of the
challenged legislation. Id at 549-50.
49. Id at 550-51. Justice White concluded his remarks by examining the ordi-
nance within a zoning framework. He noted that four generations could legally be
represented in one household under the East Cleveland ordinance, and that if circum-
stances prevented a family from qualifying for residency under the statutory defini-
tion, the family was free to move to another suburb. If the city had the power and
the desire to maintain a single-family lifestyle in a particular subdivision, Justice
White felt it must be given sufficient authority to accomplish the goal. This would
include the power to define the family. Id
[Vol. 15:337
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While the Supreme Court approached Moore from a substantive
due process analysis, the lower courts5° reached a contrary result by
applying the equal protection clause as construed in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas.5 These lower court decisions are not surprising in
light of prior Supreme Court rulings concerning zoning52 and living
arrangements5 3 invoking the "lower tier" equal protection test.
5 4
50. See note 8 supra.
51. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The City of East Cleveland relied extensively on Belle
Terre in preparing its brief. Brief for Appellee, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977). Belle Terre involved both zoning and family definition disputes.
The Belle Terre ordinance limited dwellings in certain areas to single-family occu-
pancy, but defined family to include only related individuals and up to two unrelated
individuals. The case involved six unrelated college students whose living arrange-
ment violated the ordinance. In writing the Belle Terre opinion, Justice Douglas
summarily dismissed claims that the ordinance violated fundamental rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution. The Court found no violation of the equal protection
clause since the law was a reasonable means of achieving a legitimate goal. 416 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1974). East Cleveland noted the different factual situations in Moore and
Belle Terre, but argued that the main issue was the authority of a municipality to
define the term "family." East Cleveland maintained that since its ordinance was
rational and not arbitrary, its law should be upheld under the lower tier of the equal
protection test.
52. Belle Terre was the first Supreme Court zoning case since its decision in Seat-
tle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). Both Belle Terre and Roberge
reaffirmed the Court's holding in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), that a zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of the state's police power.
53. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), is one of
the most recent Supreme Court decisions in this area. Moreno was a class action suit
brought by various individuals rendered ineligible to receive foodstamps by an
amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1970). The
amendment denied participation in the program to any household containing an indi-
vidual unrelated to any other member of the household. The Court, speaking
through Justice Brennan, concluded that the amendment was not rationally related to
the Act's purpose of providing the poor with good nutrition. The Court held that the
amendment constituted an irrational classification and violated the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
54. The Court utilizes a two-tiered test in applying the equal protection clause to
determine the reasonableness of a statutory classification. The lower tier is the tradi-
tional rational basis equal protection test. This test determines whether the statutory
classification is rational, promotes a valid governmental purpose, and treats all per-
sons who fall within the classification equally. The statute is upheld by the rational
basis test if there are any facts which may be construed to justify the classification.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic, 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See United States Dep't of Agri-
culture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The second tier of the equal protection test calls for strict scrutiny where the
classification is "suspect" or infringes on some fundamental right. The strict scrutiny
test requires the classification to meet the standards of the traditional equal protection
1978]
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The Supreme Court distinguished Moore due process from Belle
Terre equal protection by noting that the East Cleveland ordinance
impinged directly on the blood, adoption, or marriage family while
the Belle Terre ordinance was directed only at unrelated individu-
als. 5 While this distinction is valid,56 both ordinances sought the
same purpose, to eliminate traffic congestion and overcrowding. 7
The Court noted the legitimacy of the goals furthered by East Cleve-
land's ordinance, yet concluded that since the goals were only mar-
ginally served by the classification, the enactment could not survive
the rational basis test. 8 The Belle Terre ordinance apparently fails
the rational basis test for the same reasons. 9 Thus, a decision for
test and, moreover, the statute must promote a compelling state interest and be so
drawn to concern only the state interest involved. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
55. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977).
56. This distinction, while valid, should not enter into the judicial application of
the lower tier of the equal protection test with regard to zoning litigation. The dis-
tinction deals only with the family definition issue. While the difference must be
noted in determining the rationality of the ordinance, the Court must direct its exami-
nation to the statutory purpose and the means chosen to achieve it.
57. Both the East Cleveland and the Belle Terre ordinances were designed to pre-
vent traffic congestion and overcrowded neighborhoods. The East Cleveland ordi-
nance stated an additional purpose in preventing increased financial burdens on the
local school system. This difference is not sufficient to distinguish the two ordinances,
particularly since numerous living arrangements prohibited by the East Cleveland
ordinance would have no impact on the city's educational system. Brief for Appel-
lant at 49, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
58. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977). Justice Powell
referred to the inability of the means selected in the ordinance to accomplish the city's
goals. Justice Powell noted, in a hypothetical, that the law would allow husband and
wife to "live together with their unmarried children even if there were half a dozen
licensed drivers in the family, each with his own car. At the same time, it forbids an
adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both faithfully use public trans-
portation." Id
Commentators have noted the absence of trial evidence in Belle Terre showing that
unrelated households create more noise and traffic than related households. See 50
WASH. L. REv. 421, 427 (1975). Despite this lack of evidence, the Belle Terre Court
concluded that a law aimed at preventing overcrowding and traffic congestion by zon-
ing against unrelated individuals is a valid means for achieving these goals. The
Moore Court noted that East Cleveland's ordinance was much broader than the Belle
Terre ordinance and affected a broader range of lifestyles. It is difficult to conceive
how the narrowly-drawn Belle Terre ordinance was able to accomplish a statutory
goal that the more inclusive East Cleveland ordinance failed to accomplish. Argua-
bly, Justice Powell's hypothetical was intended to show that the city could employ
alternative methods, such as limiting the number of licensed drivers per family. The
same reasoning, however, could apply to the Bele Terre ordinance as well.
59. A step-by-step analysis of this conclusion clearly establishes that the East
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Moore through the rational basis-equal protection test would be tan-
tamount to overruling Belle Terre.
The Court could have distinguished Moore from Belle Terre on
the basis of related versus unrelated individuals, and applied a higher
level of equal protection scrutiny.6° This, however, would compel a
distinction based on mere accidents of birth, elevating the family re-
lationship to a suspect classification. 6' While four of the Justices62
distinguished the family from other groups, and appeared willing to
Cleveland and Belle Terre ordinances are sufficiently similar to compel identical deci-
sions. The first requirement of the lower tier equal protection test, which states that
the law must have a proper governmental purpose, was established by Belle Terre. If
a city's desire to prevent traffic congestion and overcrowding is a legitimate govern-
mental purpose in Belle Terre, then the same statutory purpose must be upheld in
East Cleveland.
The second requirement of the lower tier equal protection test, which states that the
law must be rational and not arbitrary, is well established. See note 54 supra. The
City of East Cleveland engaged in a line-drawing function by defining "family." The
Belle Terre Court acknowledged this function as legitimate, noting that every legisla-
tive line leaves "some out who might well have been included." 416 U.S. at 8 (1974).
Opponents of the East Cleveland ordinance claimed that the line of definition was
arbitrarily drawn. The city argued, however, that a more rational line would have
been the boundary of the traditional family, thus limiting the definition to the nuclear
family rather than a more encompassing definition. Brief for Appellee at 5, Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277
U.S. 32 (1928), Justice Holmes stated that "the decision of the legislature must be
accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark." Id at 41
(Holmes, J., dissenting). The East Cleveland ordinance can not be construed as be-
ing "wide of any reasonable mark," and as such the line drawn by the city should be
considered rational.
60. This second tier of the equal protection test calls for strict scrutiny where the
challenged classification infringes on some fundamental right or is based on a suspect
classification. See note 54 supra. A suspect classification has never been officially
defined by the Court. The term has traditionally been applied to classes defined by
characteristics which are merely accidents of birth, or classes that have been histori-
cally subjected to discrimination. These classes usually lack sufficient power to de-
fend themselves in the political arena. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race as suspect classification);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (alienage as suspect classification).
Despite numerous opportunities, the Court refused to recognize areas such as sex,
illegitimacy, and poverty as suspect classifications. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (sex); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (poverty).
61. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. Had the Court distinguished
Moore from Belle Terre on the basis of blood relation, this would have been a finding
for Moore on an equal protection rationale.
62. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (Powell, J., Black-
mun, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.).
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grant additional protection to the familial institution,63 a majority de-
clined to create such a category.' 4
Moore v. City of East Cleveland attempts to solve the vexing prob-
lem of family definition65 in housing and zoning litigation.66 The
Court deviates from the customary equal protection approach to the
problem67 and instead utilizes a substantive due process analysis.
This new approach not only recognizes the importance of the family
in our society, but also acknowledges the extended family as an equal
to the nuclear family unit.68
Moore fails, however, to explicitly state which extended family re-
lationships deserve the protection that accompanies strict scrutiny.
Justice Powell implies that the family is at the core of numerous deci-
sions identifying a fundamental right, and on that basis extends the
"rationale of those precedents to the family choice involved in
[Moore].' 69 Yet must one conclude from Moore that whenever leg-
63. See note 54 supra.
64. 431 U.S. at 513-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Although the term "family" appears well defined, see Wentz v. Chicago B. &
Q. R. Co., 259 Mo. 450, 168 S.W. 1166 (1914), it is actually an extremely flexible term,
capable of numerous definitions. See Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 252
F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1958), where the court defined family as "a flexible term which
must necessarily vary with given facts and circumstances." Id at 161. Laws affect-
ing marriage, welfare, insurance, and zoning traditionally use different definitions of
the term. For a general discussion of the term "family," see The Legal Family: A
Definitonal /Analyss, 13 J. FAM. L. 781 (1975).
66. Moore impliedly affects municipal zoning laws. Since the decision in City of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court has held that only those
land use regulations "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare" violate the due process
clause. The Court expanded this doctrine in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928), holding that the government's power over the general welfare should not
be narrowly defined. Courts usually defer to legislative actions where there is a ra-
tional relation between the means chosen by the statute and the desired governmental
end. Moore weakens this position. The East Cleveland ordinance, under the Euclid
standard, could be considered a legitimate governmental attempt to promote the gen-
eral welfare of the community. Despite the applicability of zoning precedent to the
facts in Moore, the Court approached the case on a substantive due process basis.
Consequently, legislators can no longer base land use laws solely on the Euclid stand-
ards since a court might rule that the affected interest is so deeply rooted in our na-
tion's history and traditions to preclude regulation. Moore has, in effect, weakened
the state's police power over land use management.
67. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), and United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), are the two most recent attempts to util-
ize the equal protection clause.
68. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
69. Id at 501.
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islation infringes on any aspect of family life the challenged law is
subject to strict scrutiny? Subsequent litigation should provide more
precise boundaries for a family definition.
Moore's primary significance lies in the Court's renewed emphasis
on the origins of substantive due process. The Court affirms the use
of history and tradition as a basis for legal decisions. This doctrine
re-emerged in Griswold,7° and continues in modem due process deci-
sions.7 1 Consonant with this trend, the Court looks to social tradi-
tions for guidance rather than pursuing a solution based on pure legal
doctrine. Whether the Court will abuse this approach through un-
principled Lochner-type decisionmaking72 will be for history to de-
cide.73
Donald W. Urban
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. See Stone, Introductiot Due Process of Due Process, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 785,
797 (1974). See generally note 32 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 33 supra. Justice Powell conceded that although history "counseled
caution and restraint of this mode of decision-making it did not counsel 'abandon-
ment.' " Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Justice Powell
acknowledged the fears over this method of adjudication and called for caution in its
application "lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections
of those who happen at the time to be members of this Court." Id at 502.
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